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SOCIALIZED IS NOT A DIRTY WORD: THE 
ONLY JUST AND REASONABLE METHOD 
FOR ASSIGNING THE COSTS OF HIGH-
VOLTAGE INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION 
LINES IS TO SOCIALIZE THEM 
Abstract: Following the federal government’s requirement that electric utilities 
must allow other power generators to use their transmission lines, investment in 
the United States electric grid has faltered. The effects of underinvestment in the 
grid have limited the proper function of competitive energy markets and stifled 
investment in renewable energy sources. The Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (“FERC”) has allowed states belonging to planning regions that coordi-
nate transmission development to create multiple methods for allocating the costs 
of new facilities crossing state lines. Many of these methods use models to fore-
cast which customers in each state benefit from the facility, and then assign costs 
based on those determinations. This Note argues that the fluid nature of the mod-
ern grid defies attempts to assign costs so specifically. Instead, FERC should re-
quire the costs of high-voltage interstate transmission facilities to be spread 
equally among all customers in a planning region. Only then, with this socialized 
cost allocation method, can cost allocations comply with the requirement that 
rate determinations be “just and reasonable.” 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 14, 2003, just after 2:00 p.m., an overgrown tree in Ohio 
brushed up against a high-voltage transmission line, causing it to shut down.1 
Over the next two hours, this faulted line combined with two faulty monitoring 
programs and one generator outage to overload the electrical grid in the Mid-
west.2 At 4:05 p.m., transmission lines began failing so quickly that operators 
                                                                                                                           
 1 J.R. Minkel, The 2003 Northeast Blackout—Five Years Later, SCI. AM., Aug. 13, 2008, 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/2003-blackout-five-years-later/, archived at http://
perma.cc/5ZA4-LCM7. 
 2 STAN MARK KAPLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40511, ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION: 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES 31 n.108 (2009) (describing how transmission line failures caused 
breakers to turn off transmission lines across the grid); Maggie Koerth-Baker, Blackout: What’s 
Wrong with the American Grid, BOINGBOING.NET (Aug. 3, 2012, 6:06 AM), http://boingboing.net/
2012/08/03/blackout-whats-wrong-with-t.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9Q7Q-QX4X (explaining 
that monitoring programs gather data on electrical flows throughout an entire grid, but that these pro-
grams still are not powerful enough to track changes in real time); Minkel, supra note 1 (noting how 
the monitoring program should have caught the fault, but the alarm system failed). 
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could not shut down or reroute power.3 Circuit breakers tripped all the way 
from New York to Michigan and into Canada.4 Within just seven minutes, 256 
power plants were offline, and fifty-five million people in eight states and 
Canada were without power.5 When the lights finally came back on, analysts 
estimated the 2003 blackout cost the U.S. economy $4 to $10 billion.6 
The 2003 blackout highlights the importance of high-voltage transmission 
facilities, or “lines,” to the U.S. energy market, the economy, and our daily 
lives.7 By definition, transmission facilities are simply high-voltage power 
lines that efficiently move electricity from a generation facility, or power plant, 
to low-voltage distribution lines that feed electricity to consumers.8 Transmis-
sion lines, however, are more than just a vehicle for moving electricity.9 With-
                                                                                                                           
 3 KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 31 & n.108 (explaining that power plants often have sensitive triggers 
that automatically shut down transmission lines when there are voltage fluctuations, but that this can 
overload other transmission lines faster than grid operators can react to prevent a blackout from ex-
panding).  
 4 James Barron, The Blackout of 2003: The Overview; Power Surge Blacks out Northeast, Hitting 
Cities in Eight States and Canada; Midday Shutdowns Disrupt Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2003, 
at A1. 
 5 KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 31 n.108; Koerth-Baker, supra note 2. 
 6 Minkel, supra note 1 (estimating the cost to be about $6 billion); Koerth-Baker, supra note 2, at 
1 (estimating the cost to be between $4 billion and $10 billion). 
 7 See ROSS BALDICK ET AL., A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON ALLOCATING THE COSTS OF NEW 
TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT: PRACTICE AND PRINCIPLES 1 (2007), available at http://
www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/Rapp_5-07_v4.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V52C-G227 (not-
ing that significant investment in transmission systems will be needed if the U.S. electrical system is 
to continue providing the service that American’s desire and on which the economy depends); Richard 
P. Bonnifield & Ronald L. Drewnowski, Transmission at a Crossroads, 21 ENERGY L.J. 447, 464 
(2000) (stating that adequate transmission is the lynchpin for a functioning economy). But see 
KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 30–32 (concluding that although new transmission lines could prevent a 
blackout similar to the one in 2003, better training of network managers, more effective tree trimming, 
and increased information about grid traffic would likely be more effective alternatives). 
 8 Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable 
Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1805–06 (2012). Electricity market infra-
structure can roughly be divided into generation, transmission, and distribution. See id. at 1805. An 
electrical system of interconnected transmission and distribution facilities is called a “grid.” See Hari 
M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773, 791 (2013). 
Power plants generate high-voltage electricity, but consumers mostly use electricity at low voltage. 
See Klass & Wilson, supra at 1805–06. Low voltage distribution is fifty kilovolts (“kV”)—50kV—or 
less. Id. at 1806. A kV is a measurement of 1,000 volts. Energy Units and Calculators Explained, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=about_energy_
conversion_calculator, archived at http://perma.cc/ZGL2-T7P (last updated Apr. 8, 2014). A mega-
watt (“mW”) is 1,000 kilowatts. John Harrison, Megawatt, NW. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL 
(Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.nwcouncil.org/history/Megawatt, archived at http://perma.cc/Q7UE-
9F5Z. Transmission lines are thus used to bring power much of the distance before the power is 
“stepped down” into low voltage usable by most consumers, and put into short-distance distribution 
lines that feed directly to the consumers. Klass & Wilson, supra at 1805–06. 
 9 See Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving 
Notions of the “Public Interest” in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 705, 729 (2010) (explaining that competitive power markets require open access to relatively 
uncongested grids); Steven Ferrey, Restructuring a Green Grid: Legal Challenges to Accommodate 
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out adequate transmission facilities, the goal of competitive electricity markets 
providing reliable and economic power cannot be fulfilled.10 As the electricity 
market is the third largest industry in the United States, even small changes in 
energy pricing and availability have a significant impact on the entire U.S. 
economy.11 
Recently, however, the United States has suffered from a significant un-
derinvestment in transmission facilities.12 Between 2000 and 2008, only 668 
miles of new transmission facilities were constructed in the United States, 
while the existing 200,000 miles of transmission facilities became increasingly 
strained by demand.13 The 2003 blackout was a symptom of this growing 
strain.14 
Although underinvestment in transmission facilities can be traced to vari-
ous obstacles, such as state permitting processes and regulation changes, one 
                                                                                                                           
New Renewable Energy Infrastructure, 39 ENVTL. L. 977, 985 (2009) (explaining that the significance 
of the grid expands beyond its ability to provide a commodity); Thomas-Olivier Léautier, Regulation 
of an Electric Power Transmission Company, 21 ENERGY J., no. 4, 2000, at 61, 63 (2000) (stating that 
the economic role of the transmission grid extends well beyond mere transportation of power; it has a 
significant impact on generation and energy pricing). 
 10 Bonnifield & Drewnowski, supra note 7, at 464 (explaining that transmission facilities are 
essential infrastructure for customer economies); James W. Moeller, Interstate Electric Transmission 
Lines and States’ Rights in the Mid-Atlantic Region, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 77, 78 (2013) (stat-
ing that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has stressed the need for new interstate 
electric transmission in its 2009 to 2014 Strategic Plan).  
 11 KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 11 (explaining that congestion costs caused by inadequate transmis-
sion capacity costs consumers hundreds of billions of dollars annually); Koerth-Baker, supra note 2 
(noting that the only 90 to 214 minutes of average downtime per consumer on the grid costs the U.S. 
about $100 billion per year); The Energy Industry in the United States, COMMERCE.GOV, 
http://selectusa.commerce.gov/industry-snapshots/energy-industry-united-states, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z3TH-U69C (last visited Mar. 2, 2015) (noting the energy sector’s relative economic 
value to the overall U.S. market). 
 12 See KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 17–18. Investment in transmission fell steadily from $4 billion 
annually in 1977 to $2.1 billion annually in 1998. Id. Though investment rose above the real dollar 
value investment in 2004, and has since continued to rise, investment overall has not kept pace with 
increased energy usage. See id.; Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 
1079, 1084–85 (2013) (stating that demand for electricity increased twenty-five percent between 1990 
and 2009 alone); Minkel, supra note 1 (stating that electric usage is projected to continue to grow by 
approximately 1.05% per year through 2030). 
 13 Seth Blumsack et al., A Quantitative Analysis of the Relationship Between Congestion and 
Reliability in Electric Power, 28 ENERGY J., no. 4, 2007, at 73, 73–74 (explaining how the grid has 
seen a dramatic rise in stress on the system caused by congestion of transmission lines); Klass, supra 
note 12, at 1085 (reporting the transmission construction mileage); John R. Norris & Jeffery S. Den-
nis, Electric Transmission Infrastructure: A Key Piece of the Energy Puzzle, 25 NAT. RES. & ENV’T, 
Spring 2011, at 3, 5 (stating the overall mileage of the U.S. electrical network). 
 14 Klass, supra note 12, at 1085 (noting that the 2003 blackout indicated the grid’s difficulty satis-
fying peak electricity demand); see supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (outlining the events of 
the 2003 blackout to highlight the difficulties of accommodating peak electrical demand with limited 
infrastructure). 
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of the most significant issues is cost allocation.15 Transmission facilities, alt-
hough costly to build, still represent a small portion of the total cost of operat-
ing a grid.16 Rather than their actual cost, determining how much a state bene-
fits from shouldering the cost of a new transmission facility constructed within 
its border is at issue, and whether the proposed line’s perceived benefits out-
weigh its costs.17 The more states a transmission facility crosses, the more dif-
ficult it becomes to assess who should pay for the line, making it more likely 
that the project will be tabled.18 
This Note argues that spreading the costs of transmission facilities across 
an entire region is the best method for allocating the costs of high-voltage in-
terstate transmission facilities.19 Not only is this consistent with the modern 
function of the U.S. energy market, but spreading costs has the potential to 
incentivize needed investment in interstate transmission facilities.20 Part I ex-
plains how transmission facilities function, how regulation over the past forty 
years has impacted the grid, and how the most recent Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission (“FERC”) determinations regulate regional transmission fa-
cilities cost allocation plans.21 Part II then discusses judicial review of cost 
allocation decisions and flaws with the beneficiary-pay method for allocating 
costs at a regional level.22 Finally, Part III argues that FERC should only ac-
                                                                                                                           
 15 Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1804 (stating the three challenges to building transmission as 
permitting, regulation changes, and cost allocation). Cost allocation remains the most hotly contested 
issue because it is the most unresolved of the three listed issues. See A Survey of Transmission Cost 
Allocation Issues, Methods and Practices, PA.-N.J.-MD. (PJM), Mar. 10, 2010, at 1 [hereinafter PJM], 
http://ftp.pjm.com/~/media/documents/reports/20100310-transmission-allocation-cost-web.ashx, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/5TQ7-9EHU; see also Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 755 (stating that the 
barrier to cost recovery of transmission lines is one of the most significant but “under-discussed” 
barriers to a proper functioning wholesale power market). 
 16 See PJM, supra note 15, at 8–9 (showing that although a new transmission facility can cost on 
average between $2 million per mile for a 230 kV line to $6.6 million per mile for a 765 kV line, 
transmission costs in total amount to only between eight and ten percent of the overall costs to con-
sumers). 
 17 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 30–31 (noting that transmission costs in traditional mar-
kets were not rejected because the actual cost of transmission facilities was so small in comparison to 
larger costs, such as generation); Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1807 (listing both quantitative and 
qualitative costs and benefits that states consider when determining cost allocation, which does not 
include the magnitude of the transmission facilities cost, but just the comparison of the costs to bene-
fits). 
 18 See RICHARD J. CAMPBELL & ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41193, ELECTRICITY 
TRANSMISSION COST ALLOCATION 4 (2012) (noting that cost allocation has become more complicat-
ed as the connection between ratepayers and utilities has become less direct); Brown & Rossi, supra 
note 9, at 717 (weighing costs and benefits at a regional scale produces very different results than at a 
local level); id. at 718 (explaining that the more state and local institutions a transmission facility 
traverses, the higher the transaction costs will be for the developer). 
 19 See infra notes 169–217 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 188–217 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 24–121 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 122–168 and accompanying text. 
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cept socialized cost allocation of high-voltage interstate transmission lines be-
cause that is the only just and reasonable method of allocating costs, and that 
this strong and consistent stance could help spur the development of needed 
transmission infrastructure.23 
I. WHAT MAKES A TRANSMISSION FACILITY TICK: SCIENCE,  
REGULATION, AND POLICY 
The importance of transmission facilities to the U.S. energy market can 
only be understood by providing a brief historical, political, and scientific con-
text.24 First, Section A describes how energy travels through transmission fa-
cilities.25 Next, Section B explains how regulations and policies at the state and 
federal level have impacted the development of the national grid.26 Section C 
then discusses how state and federal agencies determine cost allocation for 
new transmission facilities, and what methods and models they use.27 Finally, 
Section D explains FERC’s latest principles for allowing cost allocation of 
transmission facilities in regional plans as outlined in Order 1000, and the cost 
allocation methods FERC has accepted as fulfilling these principles.28 
A. It’s Electric: The Basics of Electricity in Transmission Lines 
Two basic characteristics of electricity make identifying the costs and 
benefits of transmission facilities in an interconnected grid difficult.29 First, 
energy moves along transmission facilities at almost the speed of light.30 Sec-
ond, energy flows in wires follow the path of least resistance, not the shortest 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See infra notes 169–217 and accompanying text. 
 24 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 7–8 (describing how part of the problem with transmis-
sion line development in the United States stems from its historical roots); Brown & Rossi, supra note 
9, at 705 (stating that the political aspects of state public utility laws pose a significant barrier to the 
development of new high-voltage transmission lines); Ferrey, supra note 9, at 985 (describing the 
scientific properties of electricity because transmission facilities are much more than “just wire and 
poles”). 
 25 See infra notes 29–39 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 40–62 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 63–106 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 107–121 and accompanying text. 
 29 See Blumsack et al., supra note 13, at 84 (explaining that whether a transmission facility bene-
fits or impedes a network depends on the network’s attributes such as energy usage, load, and trans-
mission line capacity and design); Ferrey, supra note 9, at 31 (noting the characteristic speed of elec-
tricity); Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 EN-
VTL. L. 1015, 1043 (2009) (describing characteristics of how electricity moves). 
 30 Ferrey, supra note 9, at 31. 
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distance.31 These two factors have an important impact on the design and utili-
zation of transmission facilities.32 
Whenever there is a change in the load or the amount of energy flowing 
over a transmission facility due either to a change in consumption or genera-
tion, the flow of energy across all other transmission facilities in the grid ad-
justs almost instantaneously to the new path of least resistance.33 Maintaining a 
balanced energy flow is important, as flow changes may suddenly overload 
lines, causing losses in energy flow due to higher resistance or, at the extreme, 
causing the line to fault.34 High-voltage facilities have a greater capacity to 
handle load shifts, have less resistance, and are able to carry energy longer dis-
tances than low-voltage facilities.35 
 Another consequence of electricity following the path of least resistance 
is that an electrical current in a transmission network will split between paral-
lel transmission facilities if, in total, splitting creates the path of least re-
sistance.36 This creates “loop flows” where energy travels in a path hundreds 
of miles longer than the most direct distance between the generator and the 
consumer.37 Loop flows occur regularly across state, regional, and national 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See Rossi, supra note 30, at 1043. 
 32 See Blumsack et al., supra note 13, at 79–80 (describing how connecting a single line immedi-
ately changes the flows on all other lines in even simple networks). 
 33 See Koerth-Baker, supra note 2 (describing how the frequency and voltage of energy in a grid 
must be maintained in almost perfect balance to prevent congestion and blackouts, and that loads 
constantly shift to stay in balance). 
 34 See id. (defining a fault as a short circuit caused by overloading a transmission facility with too 
much voltage). Faults can be problematic because when circuit breakers are tripped and cause trans-
mission facilities to shut off, power in the grid is automatically rerouted to other transmission facili-
ties, which in turn can cause that line to fault, resulting in a cascade of faults, and ultimately, a black-
out. See KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 31–32. 
 35 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 138 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,230, at 34 (Mar. 30, 2012) (stating that 
facilities between 500 kV and 765 kV are better able to absorb voltage and current swings); id. 
¶ 62,022 (showing that 500 kV lines can transfer twice the power of a 345 kV line); id. (stating that a 
345 kV line can only transfer a constant load of 1200 mW for 50 miles, while a 500 kV line and 765 
kV line can transfer such a load 200 miles and 600 miles respectively). In this Note, 230 kV or above 
is considered a high-voltage transmission facility, and anything below 230 kV is a low-voltage trans-
mission facility. See PJM, supra note 15, at 5. Loss is reduced by 75% when using a 500 kV line in-
stead of a 345 kV line. Id. at 6. Loss is reduced by 85–90% when using a 765 kV line instead of a 345 
kV line. See id. About 7% of the U.S. total electrical transmission volume is lost in transmission and 
distribution. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/
faq.cfm?id=105&t=3, archived at http://perma.cc/RW2Y-GPYK (last updated May 7, 2014). 
 36 PJM, supra note 15, at 7–8. Because energy moves along the path of least resistance, its route 
cannot be controlled through mechanical means. Id. at 7. 
 37 Id. at 7–8 (describing how a load being sent 100 miles from Ontario to Rochester where only 
60% of the load follows the direct transmission line between the two points, while the remaining 40% 
follows a path of a few hundred miles through Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania because the 
overall resistance on those lines is less). 
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boundaries.38 Thus, transmission lines often carry loads they were not intended 
to carry.39 
B. Growing Pains: Policy and Regulatory Changes Impacting the Grid 
Electricity markets traditionally operated as isolated natural monopolies 
because transmission and distribution facilities are major infrastructure in-
vestments that are not competitive if more than one exists in a given area.40 
States thus allowed electric companies to organize as utilities, which were ver-
tical monopolies that controlled generation, transmission, and distribution.41 
Physically, utilities resembled isolated webs delivering electricity to industries 
and residences within the utility’s sphere of control.42 Typically the boundary 
of a utility was constrained to its home state.43 
Most states created public utility commissions (“PUCs”), which regulated 
utilities and transmission development and set electrical rates.44 In return for 
granting a utility the sole license to generate and supply electricity in a given 
area, the state imposed electricity rate caps on utilities to protect consumers.45 
In 1978, Congress first broke the monopoly power of utilities with the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”) by encouraging small non-
utility, or “merchant,” co-generation and renewable energy plants to enter the 
electricity market.46 As these new plants came online, however, utilities faced 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Id. (noting that the loop flow described supra in supra note 37 would go from Canada to the 
Midwest, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland before ending up in New York). 
 39 See PJM, supra note 15, at 7 (explaining that the flow of power knows no political or organiza-
tional boundaries). 
 40 KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that transmission networks were originally isolated); Osof-
sky & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 794 (explaining the economics of transmission facilities). 
 41 Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 788. Within the electric market, each utility company 
would own the generation facility, the transmission lines, and the distribution facilities such as trans-
formers and electric poles. Id. Each individual utility owning all elements of electrical delivery from 
generation to distribution is considered a vertical monopoly. Id. 
 42 KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that, traditionally, utilities rarely linked to neighboring 
utilities); Bonnifield & Drewnowski, supra note 7, at 449 (describing traditional utility networks as 
webs). 
 43 BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 7–8 (explaining that utilities usually only connected for relia-
bility purposes); David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy Mar-
kets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 142 (2012) (explaining that utilities were 
originally limited to operating in a single state under the Public Utility Holding Act of 1935); id. at 
142 n.64 (noting that the relevant portions of the 1935 Act limiting expansion were repealed by the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005). 
 44 Spence & Prentice, supra note 43, at 141. 
 45 Electricity Regulation in the US: A Guide, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT 5 (2011) [here-
inafter R.A.P.], available at, http://www.raponline.org/docs/RAP_Lazar_ElectricityRegulationInThe
US_Guide_2011_03.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XKM9-PA65. This “agreement” is sometimes 
called the regulatory compact. Id. 
 46 Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645; 
Spence & Prentice, supra note 43, at 147. 
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pressure to allow merchants access to their proprietary transmission lines.47 
Yet, their natural inclination was to discriminate on use and prices, preventing 
non-utility generators from selling their electricity.48 Thus, in 1996, FERC re-
quired transmission line owners to provide nondiscriminatory access to their 
transmission lines at the same rates the owners of the lines would charge them-
selves.49 As a result, utilities became required to file tariffs for using transmis-
sion lines with newly organized single- or multi-state Independent System Op-
erators (“ISOs”).50 This effectively put transmission under federal control.51 
Relatively quickly, many utilities split their transmission and generation 
assets into separate entities because they no longer derived an economic ad-
vantage from transmission facility ownership. 52 With increased grid access, 
more merchant generators constructed transmission facilities to link to the ex-
isting grid.53 Thus, the once isolated municipal-level grid began to intercon-
nect, and utilities and merchants began selling electricity to retailers across 
state lines.54 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Spence & Prentice, supra note 43, at 147 (explaining that as more non-utility generators came 
online, it became necessary to allow these plants to competitively connect to the grid to sell their pow-
er to retail and industrial consumers). 
 48 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission 
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 
62 Fed. Reg. 12,274, 12,276 (Mar. 14, 1997) [hereinafter FERC Order 888] (codified as amended at 
18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2015)) (explaining that discriminatory access, often to due existing contracts by 
utilities with captive ratepayers, was impeding competitive electrical markets); Osofsky & Wiseman, 
supra note 8, at 794 (noting the economic benefits that come from a transmission owner maintaining a 
natural monopoly). 
 49 FERC Order 888, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,276 (requiring utilities to file nondiscriminatory open 
access transmission tariffs following criteria approved by FERC); Spence & Prentice, supra note 44, 
at 147 (explaining that FERC Order 888 began the regulation of transmission rates to prevent rate 
discrimination). 
 50 See FERC Order 888, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,276 (requiring utilities to file tariffs with newly 
formed ISOs); Spence & Prentice, supra note 43, at 147 (explaining that an ISO is a body that helps 
manage and monitor system reliability, and ensure that transmission facility owners do not engage in 
price or access discrimination). 
 51 See FERC Order 888, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,276 (subjecting all transmission line owners who 
transmit wholesale power to FERC regulation); Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1821–22 (noting that 
FERC Order 888 was unprecedented because transmission had previously been largely under state 
control). 
 52 Spence & Prentice, supra note 43, at 148 (noting this push was also due to a number of states, 
including New York, California, and Texas, turning towards market-based rate competition). 
 53 Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 735. 
 54 See Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1814 (describing the grid as a patchwork quilt of state-
authorized facilities); Léautier, supra note 9, at 63 (noting that reluctance to invest in interconnecting 
transmission facilities occurs because utilities fear opening themselves to competition, and that as a 
result of open access the miles of transmission lines per mW of peak electricity demand declined 
between 1989 and 1997 by sixteen percent); Spence & Prentice, supra note 43, at 148 (describing 
wholesale markets for buying and selling electricity that developed within Regional Transmission 
Organizations (“RTOs”) and ISOs). 
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With greater grid access, generation development increased.55 Yet, with 
fewer incentives to build transmission facilities that did not give a utility mar-
ket control, transmission development fell behind.56 The grid became 
strained.57 
In 1999, to manage the expanding grid and incentivize transmission de-
velopment, FERC authorized entities called Regional Transmission Operators 
(“RTOs”) to operate transmission facilities and coordinate planning for the 
construction of new transmission lines to ease congestion.58 Therefore, the ap-
proximately 1,800 entities that together comprise the entire electric grid in the 
United States are now variously regulated by or belong to state PUCs, an RTO 
or an ISO, and FERC.59 
Most recently, state legislatures have begun incentivizing transmission fa-
cility development by creating voluntary goals for attaining a certain percent-
age of the state’s electricity generation from renewable energy sources.60 Re-
newable Portfolio Standards (“RPS”) generally hope that fifteen to twenty per-
cent of a state’s power usage will come from renewable energy sources by a 
target date by creating financial incentives for cooperating utilities.61 The RPS 
                                                                                                                           
55 See Spence & Prentice, supra note 43, at 147–48 (explaining how a combination of 
FERC regulations and state changes to competitive electrical markets spurred private invest-
ment in generation facilities).  
 56 See Alexander T. Dadok, Comment, On the Pulse of America: The Federal Government’s 
Assertion of Jurisdiction over Electric Transmission Planning and Its Effect on the Public Interest, 91 
N.C. L. REV. 997, 1012–13 (2013) (detailing how utilities, before open access requirements, could 
deny access to transmission facilities, and how after FERC Order 888 the absence of transmission 
facilities became problematic). 
 57 See KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 9 (explaining that the absence of major investment in transmis-
sion facilities was pushing the system harder, and would result in more blackouts); Blumsack et al., 
supra note 13, at 74 (noting that both metrics RTOs and ISOs use to measure stress on the grid—
transmission loading relief and market-based relief—have risen dramatically since grid restructuring). 
 58 Reg’l Transmission Orgs., 89 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,285 (Dec. 20, 1999), 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (Mar. 8, 
2000) [hereinafter FERC Order 2000] (codified as amended at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2015)); see Dadok, 
supra note 56, at 1013. 
 59 Dadok, supra note 56, at 1010 (noting that state, regional, and federal jurisdictions overlap in 
regulating transmission facilities). Municipalities in some states retain control of permitting transmis-
sion facilities. Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 802. Only Alaska, Hawaii, and the Electric Reli-
ability Council of Texas are exempt from FERC regulation because no transmission lines cross state 
boundaries. LAWRENCE R. GREENFIELD, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY 
COMMISSION AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (2010). 
 60 Klass, supra note 12, at 1119 (stating that as of 2013 thirty-eight states adopted goals for de-
veloping renewable energy generation facilities); Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1832 (noting that 
Midwestern states are leaders in developing renewable energy goals); see, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 476B.2 (West 2014) (providing generous wind-production tax credits); MINN. STAT. § 216B.1691, 
subdiv. 2 (2012 & Supp. 2013) (requiring Minnesota to derive twenty-five percent of its consumer 
electricity from renewable energy sources); N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-02-28 (2014) (consisting of a 
voluntary renewable portfolio standard of ten percent by 2015, and lower taxes for these facilities). 
 61 Klass, supra note 12, at 1119 (noting that incentives include renewable energy credits, tariffs, 
and tax incentives). 
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goals of most states, however, cannot be attained without greater investment in 
interstate transmission facilities.62 
C. There Is No Such Thing as a Free Line: Cost Allocation for 
Transmission Facilities 
 With all of these pressures to build additional transmission facilities, the 
question invariably turns to how a developer will be repaid for its investment.63 
Accordingly, Subsection 1 first looks at who makes cost allocation decisions.64 
Then, Subsection 2 examines the formulas typically used to determine which 
ratepayers pay for new transmission facilities.65 
1. Who Makes Cost Allocation Decisions 
As control over transmission planning and use has evolved, so too have 
the methods for paying for transmission facilities.66 When utilities had a small, 
defined number of customers only served by their generation, transmission, 
and distribution facilities, passing along the costs of new transmission facilities 
that benefited these native customers was relatively straightforward.67 As elec-
tricity markets have expanded and become increasingly interconnected, how-
ever, determining how to allocate costs between customers who benefit from a 
new transmission facility and those who do not has become increasingly com-
plex.68 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Id. at 1119–20. Because the vast majority of renewable energy resources such as wind and 
solar power are located in remote parts of the United States, high-voltage transmission lines are need-
ed to bring this power to urban centers. See KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 10.  
63 See Matthew H. Brown & Richard P. Sedano, Electricity Transmission: A Primer, NAT’L 
COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY 23 (2004) [hereinafter NCEP], available at http://energy.gov
/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/primer.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Q72A-PFEN (noting the challenge that occur in an interconnected grid of 
determining which generators should pay for transmission facilities, and then in turn which 
customers should be charged for those new facilities).  
64 See infra notes 66–97 and accompanying text. 
65 See infra notes 98–106 and accompanying text. 
 66 See Gabe Maser, Note, It’s Electric, but FERC’s Cost-Causation Boogie-Woogie Fails to Justi-
fy Socialized Costs for Renewable Transmission, 100 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1832 (2012) (noting the difficul-
ty FERC now has that it must balance the costs and benefits of projects that span multiple states). See 
generally CAMPBELL & VANN, supra note 18 (describing how, for many years, FERC took a hands 
off approach to cost allocation, leaving those decisions to PUCs). 
 67 See CAMPBELL & VANN, supra note 18, at 4. 
 68 See K N Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1295, 1300–01 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating the principle 
that rate allocation must match, as closely as possible, the costs of serving the customer); CAMPBELL 
& VANN, supra note 18, at 4 (stating that cost allocation in restricted energy markets has become 
complex); Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 755 (lamenting that increasingly the benefits from new 
transmission facilities do not necessarily accrue to those customers bearing the costs of those facili-
ties). 
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Before FERC regulated transmission facilities, cost allocation occurred 
only when a utility applied to its state’s PUC for approval of a new transmis-
sion facility.69 Traditionally, transmission facilities have been categorized ei-
ther as a reliability or economic upgrade to the grid.70 Reliability upgrades are 
defined as transmission facilities that ensure a grid can accommodate peak 
loads under a reasonable set of contingencies, thus preventing blackouts.71 
Economic upgrades are defined as transmission facilities that lower consumer 
costs of electricity by expanding access to lower-cost generation facilities.72 
In most states, statutes authorize PUCs to determine the need for new 
transmission facilities based on limited criteria, which usually require that pro-
jects benefit in-state customers and that any improvement to grid reliability 
exceeds the monetary and environmental costs.73 In these states, the PUC first 
determines whether there is a need for the new transmission facility, and then 
decides if all the expenses for the new facility are reasonable.74 If the facility 
passes both criteria, the PUC allows the utility to recover the cost of the new 
facility from a small portion of each native retail users’ hourly electric bill.75 
This is called a “cost of service” approach, because a utility that builds a line is 
guaranteed repayment for costs, plus a reasonable rate of return, in exchange 
for the transmission operator only charging a reasonable price for transmission 
services.76 
As Congress began to exert more control over electricity markets, cost al-
location also became a federal matter.77 Following the Federal Power Act 
                                                                                                                           
 69 Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 834 (explaining that utilities initiate ratemaking at the 
state level); Maser, supra note 66, at 1832 (noting that federal control of ratemaking only recently 
came about through RTO and ISO ratemaking control). 
 70 BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 13. 
 71 See id. (explaining that typical analysis involves looking at the current network configuration 
and assessing future development and peak demand to see if there is worrisome probability that elec-
tric loads would be inconsistent without the new facility). 
 72 Id. (detailing a typical way in which costs are lowered by having a new transmission facility 
allow power access from a more inexpensive distant source instead of a more expensive local genera-
tion source). 
 73 Rossi, supra note 29, at 1019 (stating that about thirty states have PUCs created by state statute 
that determine transmission facility siting, while the remaining states rely on various state and local 
authorities). States control siting—determining which properties the transmission line will pass 
through. See Maser, supra note 66, at 1832. 
 74 See id. at 1020–21 (explaining that state regulators have the power to disallow transmission 
facilities where the costs, on balance, were greater than the benefits). 
 75 R.A.P., supra note 45, at 36 (explaining that utilities can recover the cost of transmission facili-
ties within a state when it is determined that the state is benefitting from the facility); id. at 47 (ex-
plaining that different classes of customers, such as retail or industrial users, are charged different 
electric rates in cost allocation).  
76 Id. at 5. 
 77 See Maser, supra note 66, at 1832 (noting how FERC’s authority has expanded such that it now 
determines how the costs of a transmission facility should be spread across consumers in multiple 
states). 
852 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:841 
(“FPA”) of 1978, Congress gave FERC control over the transmission of elec-
tricity and sale of wholesale electricity in interstate commerce.78 Cost alloca-
tion determinations for new transmission facilities crossing state lines thus fall 
under the control of FERC, RTOs or ISOs, and state PUCs.79 In these instanc-
es, RTOs or ISOs apply to FERC for approval of their decision to assign costs 
to specific participating utilities at the regional level.80 Despite RTO and ISO 
regional control of transmission, state PUCs largely retain control of important 
aspects of transmission siting and in-state cost allocation.81 
Under the FPA, FERC is required to ensure that the transmission rates it 
controls are “just and reasonable.”82 If FERC determines they are not, it has 
the power to set the rates itself.83 In making rate decisions, FERC must also 
consider what impacts their actions will have on the overall well-being of con-
sumers using the grid.84 Over the years, both FERC and the courts have used 
the cost-causation principle as the benchmark for determining just and reason-
able rates.85 The cost-causation principle requires that customers only pay rates 
that to some degree reflect the actual cost they have caused to the electrical 
system through their electrical use.86 Similarly, under the beneficiary-pay prin-
ciple, the cost of transmission facilities can be assigned to customers if it can 
reasonably show that the facility provides them a benefit.87 In other words, 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Federal Power Act, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 203, 119 Stat. 594, 995 (2005) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 
§ 824(b)(1) (2012)). 
 79 See Dadok, supra note 56, at 1006 (stating that PUCs still retain control over the siting of inter-
state transmission lines); Maser, supra note 66, at 1832 (noting that utilities under the umbrellas of 
RTOs and ISOs must also comply with their directives). 
 80 Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 804 (noting that ISOs and RTOs apply to the FERC for 
approval of transmission tariffs); Maser, supra note 66, at 1832 (explaining that RTOs set region tar-
iffs that must in turn be approved by FERC). 
 81 Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 815–16 (noting the significant control states continue to 
have over transmission decisions); Dadok, supra note 56, at 1006.  
 82 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a); see Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of 
Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 545 (2008) (stating that the just and reasonable standard of the FPA 
is the only standard for reviewing wholesale transmission rates); id. at 547 (noting that FERC has the 
authority to set aside rates that are not just and reasonable).  
 83 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a); Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 547 (stating that FERC’s power to set aside 
transmission rates need not be in the public interest).  
 84 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (2012) (declaring that selling and distributing electricity to the public is 
imbued with a public interest, and that federal regulation of transmission decisions impacting inter-
state commerce is also affected with the public interest). 
 85 K N Energy, 968 F.2d at 1300 (noting that FERC and the courts have added detail to the other-
wise open-ended “just and reasonable” requirement); see Maser, supra note 66, at 1836 (explaining 
how the courts have used the cost-causation principle and the similar beneficiary-pay principal as the 
measure for satisfying the just and reasonable requirement). 
 86 See K N Energy, 968 F.2d at 1300–01. 
 87 See Maser, supra note 66, at 1835 (explaining that the beneficiary-pay principle is really anoth-
er formulation of the cost-causation principle). The minor differences between the beneficiary-pay and 
cost-causation principles are not significant enough to warrant differentiating them in detail in this 
Note. See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC (Illinois I), 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting the 
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PUCs can only allocate costs to consumers for improvements to the electric 
grid if the consumer benefits from that improvement.88 
State PUCs under the umbrella of RTOs or ISOs have three general meth-
ods for allocating the costs of new interstate transmission facilities.89 First, the 
PUC can include the portion used by the native load users in the rate base, and 
recover the remaining cost of the line from FERC rates.90 Second, the PUC can 
exclude recovery from native load users’ rate base, and pass this cost onto 
FERC rates for retail consumers.91 Finally, the PUC can include all costs in the 
retail rate base and credit back to retail consumers the revenue the PUC gains 
from wholesale users of the transmission facility.92 
Although these decisions by the PUCs may not initially seem to have 
much national impact, as electric grids have expanded beyond the boundaries 
of states, the impact of new transmission facilities can be spread more wide-
ly.93 Historically, PUC cost decisions were limited within the state, and so a 
state PUC’s determination of a transmission facility’s costs and benefits within 
the state matched the overall costs and benefits of the proposed facility.94 To-
day, the costs and benefits of interstate transmission facilities may not be 
equally divided among each state.95 This can lead to PUCs blocking new 
                                                                                                                           
similarity between the cost-causation principle and the beneficiary-pay principle by explaining that 
assigning costs to consumers based on benefits is another way of saying that those users caused the 
new facility to be built); Maser, supra note 66, at 1835 (declining to differentiate the beneficiary-pay 
principle from the cost-causation principle because the differences are so nuanced).  
 88 Illinois I, 576 F.3d at 476; R.A.P., supra note 45, at 46 (noting how classes of consumers or 
individual consumers are allocated charges for transmission facilities based on some aspect of that 
segment’s energy consumption). 
 89 See Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 726–27. 
 90 Id. at 727 (explaining that a similar method is used to exclude only the portion of the transmis-
sion dedicated to wholesale native load users). Native load users are those within a utilities service 
area. Id. at 709. The rate base is the total of all the long-lived investments made by a utility. See 
R.A.P., supra note 45, at 40. A utility is entitled to a reasonable rate of return on its rate base. See id. 
at 41 (detailing the revenue requirement in which the rate base is factored in); see also Fed. Power 
Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 605 (1944) (stating that the revenue requirement 
must allow a utility to earn a fair return on its invested capital). 
 91 Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 727. For this method, FERC’s wholesale tariff is used as the 
basis for recovering the cost of the transmission facility. Id. at 727 n.92. Wholesale electricity is a sale 
of electricity for resale, while retail sale is to an end user. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012). 
 92 Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 727; see supra note 90 and accompanying text (explaining a 
utility’s rate base).  
 93 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 8–9 (summarizing the shift in the grid from isolated utili-
ties serving captive ratepayers into an expanded energy market where consumers in one area depend 
on energy sources in another, and energy exchanges routinely cross territories, states, and even inter-
national boundaries). 
 94 Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 722 (noting that statutory authority often limits state agencies 
from considering the benefits of a transmission facility outside the state); see CAMPBELL & VANN, 
supra note 18, at 4. 
 95 See Rossi, supra note 29, at 1022 (outlining the Arizona PUC’s rejection of a 230 mile long 
transmission line carrying power from Arizona to California, which would have been paid for by 
854 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:841 
transmission facilities that might be beneficial to the region as a whole, but 
that have just enough costs exceeding benefits in one PUC to lead that com-
mission to deny the project any cost allocation to its native users.96 When just 
one PUC rejects cost allocation for a transmission facility within its state, it 
essentially terminates the plans for the entire line.97 
2. Formulas for Determining Who Pays 
Most RTOs categorize new interstate transmission facilities as reliability 
or economic upgrades to the grid.98 Depending on how the transmission facili-
ty is categorized, the RTO will then either choose a cost allocation methodolo-
gy weighted towards determining costs through the beneficiary-pay principle, 
or through a socialization of costs.99 
RTOs determine cost allocation largely under a beneficiary-pay method-
ology when a new transmission facility is deemed to have a quantifiable eco-
nomic impact on consumers.100 If the facility is expected to change production 
costs of wholesale energy prices, then parties that will benefit from lower en-
ergy costs are expected to pay for the new transmission facility in their base 
rate.101 These models use production costs, wholesale energy prices, and ex-
penditure and revenue data as inputs to compare market prices before and after 
a facility is constructed to see which specific consumers benefit.102 A new 
transmission facility can lower electricity costs to consumers by relieving con-
                                                                                                                           
California ratepayers because Arizona did not want to bear the environmental burden of the project to 
benefit California). 
 96 See Rossi, supra note 29, at 1046 (explaining that because states usually have to pay for the 
costs of transmission facilities within their boundaries, they have a strong incentive to block transmis-
sion projects that might have broad benefits outside its boundaries if the local benefits are not suffi-
cient to justify the costs); see also id. at 1022 (noting that utilities have little incentive to add transmis-
sion lines that do not help their native load users). 
 97 See Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 755–56 (explaining that cost allocation decisions ultimate-
ly have an enormous impact on siting, and outlining a typical scenario where a transmission facility 
connecting a generation load in New Mexico to California passes through Arizona, and the strong 
incentives an intermediary state like Arizona has to block that transmission facility); Rossi, supra note 
29, at 1022 (noting that California cancelled a transmission facility plan because of this problem). 
 98 See PJM, supra note 15, at 49–54 (summarizing cost allocation practices in all U.S. RTOs, 
which categorized transmission facilities—as they relate to this Note—as either reliability or econom-
ic upgrades). 
 99 See id. at 18–19 (describing the basic use of beneficiary-based models to determine monetary 
and other specific benefits to identifiable beneficiaries, and the use of socialization for spreading the 
costs without specifying beneficiaries). 
 100 See id. (explaining that modeling programs are used to compare the effects of a new transmis-
sion facility before and after the project). 
 101 See id. Because consumers who do not benefit from a transmission facility should not be made 
to pay, those who benefit from the facility should pay for it. See Illinois I, 576 F.3d at 476. 
 102 See PJM, supra note 15, at 19. 
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gestion in the grid, which often requires substituting cheap distant generation 
sources for expensive local power sources.103 
Conversely, the socialization methodology of cost allocation is allowed 
where all grid users will benefit from a transmission upgrade, such as a relia-
bility upgrade.104 This method assumes that all system users enjoy increased 
reliability to the grid due to the new transmission facility.105 Moreover, this 
method is supported by the logic that since the beneficiaries of the transmis-
sion system change over time as load configurations change, all users should 
pay because they will eventually benefit from the facility.106 
D. FERC Order 1000: Cost Allocation Principles for Regional 
Transmission Facilities 
Despite open access requirements enforced through RTOs, transmission 
operators continued to discriminate against competitors.107 Consequently, in 
2007, FERC reformed transmission line open access requirements so that 
transmission providers had to include customers, competitors, and PUCs in the 
transmission planning process.108 Then, in 2011, FERC issued Order 1000, 
which again amended the transmission planning process by providing more 
guidelines for cost allocation at the regional and interregional level.109 RTOs 
                                                                                                                           
 103 Lester Hadsell & Hany A. Shawky, Electricity Price Volatility and the Marginal Cost of Con-
gestion: An Empirical Study of Peak Hours on the NYISO Market, 2001–2004, 27 ENERGY J., no. 2, 
2006, at 157, 166 (explaining that the cost of congestion is essentially determined by the cost to users 
for not being able to supply them with less expensive outside energy). 
 104 PJM, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that socialization can be considered a method whereby costs 
are spread among a group of users because the positive impact of an upgrade benefits all users). 
 105 W. Mass. Elec. Co. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 922, 927–28 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that a transmis-
sion facility that is a reliability upgrade provides a system-wide benefit, and so the cost of the facility 
can be socialized to all customers on the grid); PJM, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that increased relia-
bility is a public good that provides a positive externality for all grid users). For reliability-based up-
grades, however, RTOs can model using a flow-based method to look at power use at system peak to 
identify users that are causing the reliability issue. PJM, supra note 15, at 34 (using distribution fac-
tors, the flow-based method can identify consumers that contribute to reliability issues in the grid). 
The load responsible for requiring the reliability, however, may not be the same load that causes the 
violation. Id. at 18. 
 106 BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 9 (noting that since the grid changes often, the benefits of the 
grid also change over time). 
 107 See FERC Order 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. at 810 (noting that the purpose of RTOs is to prevent 
discrimination by utilities); Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 839 (explaining that allowing utili-
ties to control use of transmission lines leads to unproductive markets). 
 108 Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service [hereinafter FERC 
Order 890], 72 Fed. Reg. 12,492, 12,492 (Mar. 15, 2007) (codified  as amended at 18 C.F.R. § 35.28 
(2015)) (creating more stringent open access requirements for transmission facilities used in interstate 
commerce). 
 109 Transmission Planning & Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning & Operating Public Utili-
ties, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,844–45 (Aug. 11, 2011) [hereinafter FERC Order 1000] (codified as 
amended in scattered section of 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2015)) (describing the elements and purpose of 
FERC Order 890 that required updating). 
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and ISOs had twelve months to file ratemaking plans consistent with the Or-
der.110 
FERC Order 1000 helps ensure that regional transmission planning pro-
cesses meet emerging transmission needs in an efficient and cost-effective 
manner, and that the costs of new facilities are fairly allocated to those who 
benefit from them.111 At the planning level, FERC Order 1000 requires that 
regional plans be open to cost allocation for both utility and merchant trans-
mission developments.112 The Order requires RTOs and ISOs to state their 
methods for allocating costs for new transmission facilities within the region, 
and for lines crossing into neighboring planning regions.113 
For both regional and interregional cost allocation, FERC Order 1000 
outlines six guiding principles, three of which are relevant to this Note.114 
First, regions must allocate the costs of new transmission facilities in a manner 
roughly equal to the benefits those consumers or regions derive from the pro-
ject.115 Second, parties or regions receiving no benefits from a new transmis-
sion facility at present, or are unlikely to benefit from it in the future, must not 
be forced to accept the cost allocation determination.116 Finally, planning re-
gions may choose to create different cost allocation methods for transmission 
facilities they designate as either reliability, economic, or public policy up-
grades to the grid.117 
By mid-2013, FERC had either accepted RTO and ISO ratemaking plans 
or remanded the plans as not meeting the cost allocation principles of FERC 
                                                                                                                           
 110 Id. at 49,957 (explaining that this deadline was to allow for utility compliance with FERC 
Order 1000’s non-interregional coordination rules). 
 111 Id. at 49,845 (summarizing the two main objectives of FERC Order 1000). 
 112 Id. at 49,846. In terms of eligibility, non-incumbent transmission developers must be consid-
ered for regional cost allocation on the same basis as an incumbent transmission developer. Id. at 
49,899. 
 113 Id. at 49,928 (stating that RTOs, ISOs, and PUCs must comply with the planning requirements 
of FERC Order 1000). 
 114 Id. at 49,932. Three of the six principles either deal with aspects of cost allocation related to 
transmission planning or coordination between regions that are beyond the scope of this Note. Id. 
 115 Id. at 49,932. FERC Order 1000 states:  
[I]n determining the beneficiaries of transmission facilities, a regional transmission 
planning process may consider benefits including, but not limited to, the extent to 
which transmission facilities, individually or in the aggregate, provide for maintaining 
reliability and sharing reserves, production cost savings and congestion relief, and/or 
meeting public policy requirements established by state or federal law or regulation that 
may drive transmission needs. 
Id. 
 116 Id. (“A transmission planning region that receives no benefit from an interregional transmis-
sion facility that is located in that region, either at present or in a likely future scenario, must not be 
involuntarily allocated any of the costs of that facility.”). 
 117 Id. This rule further requires that the cost allocation method used must be explained in detail 
to prove compliance with FERC Order 1000. Id. 
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Order 1000.118 The proposals FERC accepted for transmission facilities select-
ed in regional plans for multi-state RTOs or ISOs allowed projects to be cate-
gorized as economic, reliability, and public policy for cost allocation purposes 
per FERC Order 1000.119 For reliability projects, FERC approved total sociali-
zation of costs, mixed socialization and beneficiary-pay methods, and entirely 
beneficiary-pay methods.120 For economic projects, in RTOs and ISOs where 
economic and reliability projects were differentiated and approved by FERC, 
no cost allocation methods were fully socialized, but rather would generally be 
half-socialized and half-beneficiary-pay or entirely beneficiary-pay.121 
II. MORE ART THAN SCIENCE: QUANTIFYING COSTS AND BENEFITS 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) determines if an 
interstate transmission rate is just and reasonable by reviewing methods for 
determining which users have caused the need for the new transmission facility 
and thus will pay for the facility.122 Methods for determining cost-causation, 
however, are seldom discussed in detail in cases involving cost allocation dis-
putes because courts defer to FERC’s determinations.123 There are methodo-
                                                                                                                           
 118 See FERC, ORDER NO. 1000 COMPLIANCE FILINGS & ORDERS, available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/trans-plan/filings.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/
TQ9M-NQWK (last visited Mar. 3, 2015) (listing each RTO and ISO filing and the corresponding 
FERC responses). 
 119 FERC Order 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,932 (allowing facilities to be categorized as reliability, 
economic, or public-policy based projects); see Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 142 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,206, paras. 
284–86 (Mar. 22, 2013) [hereinafter WESCO Filing] (assigning different cost allocation methods to 
economic, reliability, and public-policy projects); Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc. & 
the MISO Transmission Owners, 142 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215, paras. 421, 487 (Mar. 22, 2013) [hereinafter 
MISO Filing] (categorizing projects as either multi-value projects, multi-economic projects, or base-
line reliability projects). But see Southwest Power Pool, Inc., 144 F.E.R.C. ¶ 059, para. 336 n.675 
(July 18, 2013) (only differentiating transmission facilities in regional plans based on kV, not on pro-
ject type). 
 120 See MISO Filing, 142 F.E.R.C. at para. 421 (allowing 100% postage stamp cost allocation of 
projects that meet green energy guidelines); WESCO Filing, 142 F.E.R.C. at para. 284 (allocating 
100% of a reliability line’s cost by the cost-causation principle); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Indi-
cated PJM Transmission Owners, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 142 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,214, para. 347 (Mar. 22, 2013) [hereinafter PJM Filing] (splitting cost allocation for 
reliability projects on a 50% postage stamp basis and 50% on a beneficiary-pay basis). 
 121 See WESCO Filing, 142 F.E.R.C. at para. 285 (allocating 100% of a reliability line’s cost by 
aggregate load-weighted benefits to cost for each system benefiting from the new facility); PJM Fil-
ing, 142 F.E.R.C. at para. 349 (allowing 50% postage stamp cost allocation of economic regional 
facilities and 50% allocation based on decrease in load energy payments by zone). 
 122 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012) (granting FERC authority over transmission of electricity in 
interstate commerce); id. § 824e(a) (granting FERC power to approve rates, or set rates where they are 
not just or reasonable). 
 123 See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC (Illinois I), 576 F.3d 470, 474–75 (7th Cir. 2009) (stat-
ing that FERC did not articulate a plausible reason for assigning costs only because it gave no reason 
for assigning costs); Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wis. v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1058, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
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logical issues, however, with the way in which Regional Transmission Opera-
tors (“RTOs”) and Independent System Operators (“ISOs”) categorize trans-
mission facilities as either reliability or economic upgrades to allocate costs in 
a non-socialized manner.124 Section A examines how courts review cost alloca-
tion determinations using the cost-causation principle.125 Section B then dis-
cusses issues with the distinction between reliability and economic categoriza-
tions that lead to employing different cost-allocation methods.126 
A. Close Enough for Government Work: Judicial Review  
of Cost Allocation  
On appeal from a party challenging FERC’s socialized cost allocation de-
termination, courts require FERC to identify beneficiaries and quantify the 
benefits these consumers receive from the proposed transmission facility to 
satisfy the cost-causation principle.127 Courts will uphold a cost allocation 
where FERC articulates a plausible reason that consumers will roughly pay for 
a service that is commensurate with the benefits they receive, even if the cost 
allocation imperfectly tracks the cost-causation principle.128 The courts have 
allowed socialized cost allocations for reliability projects to satisfy the just and 
reasonable requirement because courts usually adopt FERC’s reasoning that in 
large grids the diffuse benefit and economic impact of such projects warrants 
spreading costs equally among all grid users.129  
                                                                                                                           
(noting that FERC’s ratemaking decision will be upheld by the court so long as it is not arbitrary and 
capricious). 
 124 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 8 (noting that the benefits of a transmission facility will 
eventually accrue to users of the grid other than those who originally built the facility); Blumsack et 
al., supra note 13, at 76 (arguing that drawing a distinction between reliability and economic benefits 
of transmission lines is incorrect). 
 125 See infra notes 127–147 and accompanying text. 
 126 See infra notes 148–168 and accompanying text. 
 127 Maser, supra note 66, at 1836 (noting the general rule that courts require individualized cost-
benefit analysis for cost allocations to meet the cost-causation principle). Due to the deference courts 
give to FERC, FERC has great power to set transmission rates. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (holding that courts are to be deferential to decisions 
made by agencies where Congress has spoken clearly on the matter); Town of Norwood v. FERC, 962 
F.2d 20, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (explaining the requirement that an agency decision must be reasoned 
and based on substantial evidence). 
 128 See, e.g., Illinois I, 576 F.3d at 477 (noting that courts have never required precision when 
approving cost allocation decisions); Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wis., 545 F.3d at 1061 (requiring only 
that FERC’s ratemaking decision not be arbitrary and capricious); W. Mass. Elec. Co. v. FERC, 165 
F.3d 922, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (deferring to FERC’s decision when it supplies sufficient reasoning 
backed up by substantial evidence, even though the court need only find FERC’s decision reasonable).  
 129 See Entergy Servs., Inc. v. FERC, 319 F.3d 536, 543 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (crediting reasoning that 
socializing the costs of reliability upgrades prevents price signal issues with the market); W. Mass. 
Elec., 165 F.3d at 927 (holding that the project had system-wide benefits to the grid); Maser, supra 
note 66, at 1840 (stating that courts consistently uphold socializing costs for reliability upgrades). But 
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Courts have upheld socialized cost allocation where FERC has deter-
mined that specifically identifying transmission facility beneficiaries is not 
feasible.130 For example, in 1999, in Western Massachusetts Electric Co. v. 
FERC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that any grid en-
hancement is presumed to benefit the entire grid, and so its cost can be social-
ized.131 The court accepted FERC’s three reasons that the upgrades provided a 
system-wide benefit due to the difficulty of assigning benefits to consumers 
when electricity flows freely though a grid.132 First, the physical configuration 
of the upgrades made it such that they not only connected a new generation 
facility to the grid, but also enhanced system reliability for all users.133 Second, 
the load on the upgraded transmission facilities would not remain constant, and 
therefore, when the flow from the new generation facility is low, other grid 
customers would be making use of the new transmission facility.134 Finally, 
because of the variable load from the new facility, it could not be determined 
whether the upgrade was merely restoring the grid to its previous capability, or 
improving it.135 
In other cases, socializing the costs of reliability upgrades has also been 
based on a desire to minimize distortions for new generation plants that could 
result from holding to traditional cost-causation principles.136 For example, in 
2003, in Entergy Services, Inc. v. FERC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit upheld socialization primarily because the court credited FERC’s evi-
dence and logic that a standard policy to spread the costs of transmission up-
grades protecting equipment near new generators minimized the incentive for 
                                                                                                                           
cf. Illinois I, 576 F.3d at 476 (stating that FERC cannot approve socialized cost allocation where it 
does not justify the costs borne by users to the benefits those users receive). 
 130 See W. Mass. Elec., 165 F.3d at 927 (noting that since the grid configuration will not remain 
constant and the upgrades cannot be deemed to flow to consumers who cased the reliability issue, the 
court would not require identifying beneficiaries for cost allocation); Me. Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 
964 F.2d 5, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (explaining that, in an integrated transmission network, all transmission 
facilities contribute to all users of the system); City of Holyoke Gas & Elec. Dep’t v. FERC, 954 F.2d 
740, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that if a transmission network is integrated all users benefit in some 
way from new transmission facilities). 
 131 W. Mass. Elec., 165 F.3d at 927 (finding that FERC had a “consistent policy to assign the 
costs of system-wide benefits to all customers on an integrated transmission grid,” and noting that the 
court “approved the underlying rationale of this policy” because “[w]hen a system is integrated, any 
system enhancements are presumed to benefit the entire system”). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. When buyers and sellers want more electricity on a grid than transmission facilities can 
support, ISOs have the ability to curtail or stop contracts. NCEP, supra note 63, at 32. If there is not 
enough capacity, the operators will cut off parts of the grid to prevent a blackout. Id. 
 134 W. Mass. Elec., 165 F.3d at 927. When the load on a transmission facility is low, but is high 
on other lines, electricity will automatically redirect along the lower load wire even if that power has 
been contracted to flow through different transmission facility. See NCEP, supra note 63, at 32–33; 
supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text (explaining loop flows). 
 135 W. Mass. Elec., 165 F.3d at 927. 
 136 See Entergy, 319 F.3d at 544; PJM, supra note 15, at 19. 
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utilities to make lavish expenditures.137 In addition, the court was persuaded 
that by spreading these costs among all market participants, new generators 
would not be disadvantaged when trying to compete against incumbent utilities 
already capable of rolling transmission costs into their retail base rate.138 
Still, FERC must provide a plausible basis for determining that a social-
ized cost allocation is just and reasonable, even if FERC can provide little evi-
dence for its decision.139 In 2009, in Illinois Commerce Commission v. FERC 
(Illinois I), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied FERC’s 
acceptance of the RTO’s socialized cost allocation because FERC did not pro-
vide any reasons for why it could not articulate the benefits of 500 kV trans-
mission facilities when it could articulate benefits for 345 kV transmission fa-
cilities.140 Although the D.C. Circuit noted that a new transmission facility 
benefited any utility on that grid, FERC could not then assign costs where it 
did not justify the costs in relation to those benefits.141 When identifying costs 
to be allocated, however, FERC did not need to calculate benefits to any spe-
cific threshold—not even to the last hundred million dollars.142 Thus, the court 
gave little indication as to what sort of relationship between costs and benefits 
                                                                                                                           
 137 319 F.3d at 544 (crediting FERC’s rationale that spreading costs creates more accurate pric-
ing). In this case, Entergy Services, Inc. wished to have the cost of upgrades to protect its equipment 
against faults near newly interconnecting merchant generators assigned to merchant generators. Id. at 
538–39. Merchant generators are at a market disadvantage in this context, because unlike utilities, 
they do not have native customers to assign costs to. See id. at 543; cf. R.A.P., supra note 45, at 59 
(explaining the Averch-Johnson Effect, which finds that where a utility has the power to assign the 
costs of investments to native ratepayers the utility has the incentive to overbuild its system to in-
crease revenue and profit).  
 138 Entergy, 319 F.3d at 543. 
 139 See Norwood, 962 F.2d at 22 (noting that because rate determination require a high degree of 
technical expertise and involve policy judgments, judicial review is deferential). 
 140 576 F.3d at 477. FERC had approved a Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (“PJM”) RTO 
interconnection’s decision to socialize the costs of new transmission facilities over 500 kV across the 
entire system. Id. at 473–74. This decision intended to benefit the eastern part of PJM, located mostly 
in a more rural area of Midwestern United States, where power plants are located further from cus-
tomers and 500 kV or greater facilities are needed. Id. at 475. Conversely, the western part of PJM is 
largely the area around Chicago where there are many power plants located near customers and only 
345 kV lines are necessary. Id. 
 141 Id. at 477–78. FERC simply argued that new high-capacity transmission facilities benefit all 
system users because it increases the grid’s reliability, but did not then adequately compare these 
benefits to the costs it then allocated. Id. at 474. FERC gave no specifics for stating how they intended 
to show that new transmission lines over 500kV would benefit the utilities in the western part of the 
interconnect that brought the suit, yet had provided this information for 345 kV. Id. at 477. The court 
would not accept FERC’s contention that it was too difficult to measure benefits because both sides 
would endlessly litigate the results. Id. at 475. 
 142 Id. at 477 (“We do not suggest that the Commission has to calculate benefits to the last penny, 
or for that matter to the last million or ten million or perhaps hundred million dollars.”). 
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would have satisfied the cost-causation principle had FERC put one for-
ward.143 
Moreover, FERC’s ability to set socialized cost allocations has not been 
found to violate the Tenth Amendment even if many of the benefits of a pro-
posed transmission facility do not accrue to a state.144 In 2013, in Illinois 
Commerce Commission v. FERC (Illinois II), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit quickly dispatched the appellant utilities’ concerns that 
FERC’s socialized cost allocation amounted to the federal government requir-
ing states to build transmission lines for the federal government to use.145 The 
court determined that just because a state may be incentivized to accept a pro-
ject that provides it little benefit—so that in turn it reaps the benefit of other 
socialized cost determinations providing the state with greater benefit—this 
does not make a rate determination by FERC impermissible.146 Rather, if a 
utility disagrees with an RTO’s rate determination, it is free to leave and try its 
luck with another RTO.147 
B. Blurred Lines: Determining Whether a Transmission Facility Helps 
Reliability or Improves Cost Is Not as Easy as It Used to Be 
Courts have followed logic put forward by FERC that transmission facili-
ties can be designated as reliability or economic upgrades to the grid.148 Eco-
nomic upgrades are largely calculated under the beneficiary-pay principle, and 
are less often subject to socialized cost-allocation by RTOs.149 Although the 
distinction between reliability and economic upgrades thus results in signifi-
cant differences in who pays for the transmission facilities, the actual distinc-
tion between these categories is problematic.150 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See id. at 476 (comparing costs and benefits in a passing reference by stating that a hypothet-
ical monetized benefit 480 times greater than the cost allocated would not satisfy the cost-causation 
principle). 
 144 Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC (Illinois II), 721 F.3d 764, 773 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014). 
 145 See id. 
 146 See id. (holding that the argument by appellant utilities was frivolous). 
 147 Id. (noting that belonging to an RTO or ISO is voluntary); id. at 780 (asserting that withdraw-
ing from an RTO does not mean the utility no longer has an obligation to make cost allocation pay-
ments determined when it was a part of the RTO). 
 148 See Norwood, 962 F.2d at 22 (stating that since ratemaking determinations are highly tech-
nical, the courts are deferential to FERC’s determinations); FERC Order 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,932 
(allowing applicants to classify transmission facilities as being economic or reliability upgrades); Pub. 
Serv. Co. of Colo., 142 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,206, paras. 284–86 (Mar. 22, 2013) (classifying transmission 
facilities as being economic and reliability upgrades). 
 149 See supra notes 118–121 and accompanying text (detailing RTO and ISO filings for interstate 
transmission facilities, which indicate that economic facilities are more often subject to beneficiary-
pay cost allocation methodologies than are reliability facilities). 
 150 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 13 (explaining that the distinction between economic 
and reliability facilities has become more flawed as the electric market has evolved). 
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The category of reliability transmission facilities developed partly be-
cause labeling a facility as such eased its approval in the planning process.151 
Although a state wants to ensure all its citizens have access to electricity, it 
does not want to increase rates on residential consumers who vote.152 If a 
transmission facility is designated as a reliability upgrade, then economic ben-
efits become incalculable, and so the fear of blackouts spurs investment and 
quells opposition.153 
Similarly, the category of economic transmission facilities developed at 
the state level planning process.154 In a stable and perfectly contained trans-
mission system, the benefits of new transmission facilities could be accurately 
calculated.155 When electric markets were vertically controlled and isolated, 
load use by native ratepayers was well known, making beneficiary determina-
tions relatively straightforward.156 
In modern open-access markets, however, identifying beneficiaries has 
become more complex because none of the assumptions required for accurate 
modeling hold.157 As transmission systems have expanded, there are more con-
sumers connecting to the system that are changing their energy usage over 
time.158 Moreover, there are more changes in the location and intensity of 
                                                                                                                           
 151 Id. at 16 (explaining how bypassing the beneficiary-pay process of cost assigning may ease 
acceptance of facilities in the planning and development process); see PJM, supra note 15, at 15 
(showing how an RTOs planning process focuses on reliability upgrades). 
 152 See Rossi, supra note 29, at 1019 (explaining that utilities have a duty to serve native custom-
ers, and detailing the delicate balance that exists between providing needed infrastructure and not 
having rates go up unnecessarily); R.A.P., supra note 45, at 50 (stating that there is political pressure 
on PUCs to limit electrical rate increases). 
 153 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 16 (describing how the “bogeyman” fear of blackouts 
can be used in the transmission planning process to push reliability upgrades through opposition that 
cites increased costs and land use concerns); PJM, supra note 15, at 16 (noting that the core of trans-
mission planning is ensuring system reliability). 
 154 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 14 (noting that the economic terminology developed 
before open access requirements); Rossi, supra note 30, at 1019 (explaining that state and local regu-
lators began evaluating transmission projects on a need basis to ensure that customers did not pay for 
wasteful projects); see also N.Y. PUB SERV. LAW § 122(1) (McKinney 2014) (requiring that a trans-
mission facility fulfill a public interest, convenience, and necessity to justify construction).  
 155 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 25 (stating that transmission models are accurate in their 
predictions if their assumptions about the future of generation and load growth are known, and the 
market is perfectly competitive); cf. PJM, supra note 15, at 18 (admitting that there is no consensus on 
exactly how to define a beneficiary in an interconnected grid).  
 156 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 7–8 (noting that before open access to transmission 
systems, cost allocation determinations were not contentious because a transmission facility only 
benefitted a defined number of customers); Spence & Prentice, supra note 43, at 146 (noting that 
electricity markets were largely vertically integrated before restructuring in the 1980s).  
 157 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 8 (explaining that the old cost-causation model may no 
longer be appropriate); id. at 25 (stating that none of the assumptions required for accurate calculation 
can be found in practice). 
 158 See id. at 25 (noting the responsiveness of demand load to changes in prices); CAMPBELL & 
VANN, supra note 18, at 3 (explaining that demand loads have expanded as transmission facilities 
expand beyond contained investor-owned utilities); NCEP, supra note 63, at 23 (stating that when 
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transmission generators.159 Since models for determining beneficiaries rely on 
forecasts of future system conditions, the more variable and uncertain the fac-
tors are, the more inaccurate the calculations for benefits become.160 
More importantly, the distinction between transmission facilities serving 
either economic or reliability functions does not accurately describe how 
transmission facilities function in an open grid.161 Now that transmission sys-
tems are not vertically integrated, electricity flows from multiple generation 
sources to multiple end users through an interconnected system along the path 
of least resistance.162 At some point, all transmission facilities in a grid will 
either lower the risk of interruptions, provide economic benefits to users, or 
function in both capacities.163 
More problematically, the quantified benefits of certain transmission fa-
cilities may in turn have negative impacts to users on other parts of the grid.164 
For instance, built transmission facilities increasing grid reliability can actually 
increase congestion in the grid.165 Conversely, lines that decrease costs to cer-
tain users by easing congestion may raise prices for consumers in other parts of 
the grid.166 As the grid changes, however, so too may the roles of these trans-
                                                                                                                           
vertically integrated monopolies built new transmission facilities, there was no question about who 
would build the transmission facilities—the utilities—and thus no question as to who would pay—
their native load users).  
 159 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 26 (explaining that it is easier to determine generation 
development in vertical monopoly markets than it is in restructured electricity markets); Rossi, supra 
note 29, at 1017 (describing federal pushes to expand renewable energy sources); id. at 1042 (noting 
that renewable energy is more volatile than traditional fossil fuel generation). 
 160 BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 25 (noting that the uncertainty of multiple factors in benefi-
ciary-pay models make them inaccurate); Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 755 (noting that increasing 
the benefits of new transmission facilities do not actually flow to the customers who are determined 
through traditional rate regulation). 
 161 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 14 (arguing that the distinction between economic and 
reliability is artificial); Blumsack et al., supra note 13, at 76 (concluding that the distinction between 
economic and reliability is inaccurate). 
 162 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 15 (noting that in an integrated system supply and de-
mand are both are increasing); NCEP, supra note 63, at 23 (explaining that the modern grid has 
changed by having multiple generators all interconnected); supra notes 33–39 and accompanying text 
(describing how electricity moves along transmission facilities by following the path of least re-
sistance, which can create loop flows).  
 163 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 14–15 (explaining that all transmission facilities will at 
some point serve both economic and reliability purposes). 
 164 See Blumsack et al., supra note 13, at 79 (outlining how the addition of a connecting line in a 
simple parallel network can create congestion in all other lines in the network). 
 165 See id. When a lower voltage line joins simple parallel networks, the new line can cause con-
gestion without becoming congested. See id. at 79–80 (detailing this theory, known as Braess’s para-
dox, through modeling energy networks). 
 166 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 24 (explaining how economic lines that increase access 
to once remote and inexpensive generation plants raises the price of electricity from that plant, thus 
raising prices for the plant’s original customers). 
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mission facilities.167 Therefore, the very reasons for focusing on benefits to 
specific users that were the hallmark of the distinction between the two catego-
ries may lead to inaccurate cost and benefit determinations to all grid users 
over time.168 
III. ACCEPTING UNCERTAINTY FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL: SOCIALIZING THE 
COSTS OF HIGH-VOLTAGE INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION FACILITIES 
The increasing complexity of the interconnected electrical grid requires 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to adapt and modernize 
its cost allocation principles.169 To achieve this, socialized cost allocation 
should become recognized as the primary method for fulfilling the just and 
reasonable requirement for high-voltage interstate transmission facilities.170 To 
accomplish this, both FERC and the courts should accept that although benefi-
ciary-pay models can temporarily specify beneficiaries, the changing nature of 
the grid is such that in the long run these determinations are no longer just and 
reasonable.171 Socializing costs across an entire grid, however, is a far more 
fair and accurate method.172 Section A argues that the beneficiary-pay principle 
is no longer a just and reasonable method for determining cost allocation for 
interstate transmission facilities.173 Section B then argues that socializing the 
costs for these transmission facilities is not only just and reasonable, but it is 
also preferable for incentivizing transmission development. 174 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See Blumsack et al., supra note 13, at 94 (stating that the more complex the grid becomes, the 
more difficult it becomes to make a distinction between reliability and economic benefits for transmis-
sion facilities). 
 168 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 24 (noting that economic facilities can raise prices on 
some consumers); Blumsack et al., supra note 13, at 79–80 (explaining that transmission facilities 
constructed to increase reliability can decrease electricity delivery in other parts of the grid). 
169 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 23–24 (explaining how the increasing intercon-
nectedness of the grid changes beneficiary determinations). 
 170 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 31–32 (explaining that one cost allocation solution is to 
spread the costs of transmission facilities across an entire Regional Transmission Operator (“RTO”) or 
Independent System Operator (“ISO”) because they are the functional equivalent of the historic verti-
cally integrated monopoly); Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 755 (noting that one of the largest barri-
ers to development of a competitive power market is the use of beneficiary-pay methods for cost allo-
cation). 
 171 See generally BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7 (noting that because grids have expanded, benefi-
ciary-pay methods are imprecise and are only temporarily accurate and that socializing costs is just a 
variant of the beneficiary-pay model in a large grid); PJM, supra note 15 (noting that beneficiary-pay 
models are flawed by timing and circumstance in how they allocate costs to grid users). 
 172 See generally BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7 (arguing that beneficiaries are now generally 
dispersed across a region, and so socializing costs across a region is just a more accurate form of the 
beneficiary-pay method for certain transmission projects); PJM, supra note 15 (noting that socialized 
cost allocation may be more accurate because it inherently factors in the changing nature of the grid 
which will shift who benefits from which transmission facilities). 
 173 See infra notes 175–187 and accompanying text. 
 174 See infra notes 188–217 and accompanying text. 
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A. You Cannot Predict the Future: The Limits of Modeling 
Socialized cost allocation should be used for high-voltage interstate 
transmission facilities because the factors needed for accurate beneficiary-pay 
modeling are inaccurate.175 Beneficiary-pay models accurately quantify the 
benefits of a transmission facility only when three basic factors are somewhat 
stable over time: load generation, the location of load generation, and load 
consumption.176 
For most modern grids, accurately determining each factor in beneficiary-
pay models is problematic.177 First, load generation is increasingly volatile due 
to both the greater number of generation facilities and the variable production 
schedules of renewable energy sources.178 Second, generation facilities are be-
ing built further away from consumers to decrease generation facility costs and 
because renewable energy sources are often far away from most energy con-
sumers.179 Finally, factors impacting load location and use become more varia-
ble and harder to determine in expanded grids.180 Any change to these assump-
tions about beneficiaries or generation facilities can completely change a mod-
el’s outcome.181 
Beyond the difficulty of determining beneficiaries in a given grid config-
uration, determinations become even more unreliable as the grid changes over 
                                                                                                                           
 175 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 25 (noting that cost allocation determinations are accu-
rate when load and generation growth are known, but these factors cannot be determined in the com-
plex modern grid); PJM, supra note 15, at 18 (acknowledging that the results of beneficiary-pay mod-
els in interconnected grids are based on assumptions about timing and circumstances that, if changed, 
would completely alter the beneficiary determinations). 
 176 BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 25 (listing load location and load growth as key factors in 
determining cost allocation); PJM, supra note 15, at 17 (stating that the location and levels of load and 
generation in the grid are important for transmission planning). 
 177 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 25 (noting the problems with knowing future market 
conditions needed for accurate beneficiary-pay models); PJM, supra note 15, at 18 (noting that chang-
es to model assumptions result in different beneficiaries being identified).  
 178 See Norris & Dennis, supra note 13, at 5 (noting that the grid is becoming increasingly com-
plex as it connects more existing generation sources and incorporates more renewable energy 
sources); Rossi, supra note 29, at 1042 (describing renewable energy sources as variable). 
 179 See Erin Dewey, Note, Sundown and You Better Take Care: Why Sunset Provisions Harm the 
Renewable Energy Industry and Violate Tax Principles, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1105, 1112 (2011) (noting 
the long distances required for transmission facilities to connect wind energy sources to consumers); 
Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 790–91 (same). 
 180 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 25 (noting that load growth cannot be accurately pre-
dicted); PJM, supra note 15, at 17 (explaining that studies used to determine load use require knowing 
prices); Hadsell & Shawky, supra note 103, at 158 (noting that pricing in restructured energy markets 
is more volatile than in traditional energy markets). 
 181 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 25 (noting that many assumptions in beneficiary-pay 
models, if changed, would alter which customers are considered beneficiaries); PJM, supra note 15, at 
18 (acknowledging that any changes to generation can completely change the outcome of models). 
866 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:841 
time.182 Consider, for instance, an interstate transmission facility connecting a 
renewable energy facility to an interstate grid183 Changes in how the transmis-
sion facility is used for increasing either reliability or economic utility, or 
changes to population distributions on the grid, can change beneficiaries of 
that transmission facility periodically.184 
Furthermore, even though these shifts in benefits occur routinely, cost al-
locations are final.185 Consequently, short of periodically adjusting beneficiary 
determinations, relying on the beneficiary-pay method for assigning the costs 
of high-voltage interstate transmission facilities does not comply with the just 
and reasonable rate principle.186 Accordingly, FERC should not accept benefi-
ciary-pay methods as satisfying the cost allocation principle for high-voltage 
interstate transmission facilities.187 
B. Socializing Is Not Socialism: When Everyone Benefits, It Is Just and 
Reasonable for Everyone to Pay 
Cost allocation is not an exact science because electricity usage and flow 
patterns cannot be accurately predicted over time.188 Socializing cost allocation 
for high-voltage interstate transmission facilities accepts this reality in a more 
consistent and accurate manner than the beneficiary-pay method.189 Further-
                                                                                                                           
 182 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 3–4 (explaining that beneficiaries change over time due 
to changes in economic activity and demographic shifts). 
 183 See Rossi, supra note 29, at 1042 (outlining the difficulties balancing the grid with a large 
renewable energy source because stable fossil-fuel based generation sources must also be kept on 
reserve). 
 184 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 9 (stating that the benefits of transmission facilities 
change constantly). 
 185 See id. at 9 (noting constant shifts); id. at 67 (recognizing issues with the current method of 
cost allocation where initial cost allocations are considered final); PJM, supra note 15, at 18 (stating 
that beneficiary-pay determinations are partly based on timing assumptions).  
 186 See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC (Illinois I), 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that FERC is not authorized to assign the costs of a transmission facility to a group of ratepayers that 
receive benefits that are trivial compared to the costs); BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 68 (suggest-
ing periodic review of cost allocation decisions at significant time intervals since there can be devia-
tions from the original basis for assigning costs). 
 187 See FERC Order 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,932 (requiring benefits to roughly equal costs to 
rate-paying consumers); BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 25 (noting that calculations of benefits are 
not accurate). 
 188 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 9 (explaining that shifts in benefits occur constantly); 
Patrick J. McCormick III & Sean B. Cunningham, The Requirements of the “Just and Reasonable” 
Standard: Legal Bases for Reform of Electric Transmission Rates, 21 ENERGY L.J. 389, 400 (2000) 
(describing ratemaking as more an art than a science); PJM, supra note 15, at 18 (noting that benefi-
ciary determinations are based on timing and circumstance); supra notes 175–187 and accompanying 
text (describing how beneficiary-pay models are flawed because of the variability of the essential 
model inputs such as load generation, load generation location, and load consumption).  
 189 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 3 (stating that despite supporting the beneficiary-pay 
method in some instances, the cost of many transmission investments should be spread across all users 
in a network since this method does incorporate inaccurate beneficiary considerations). 
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more, socializing costs may prove more suitable towards furthering federal and 
state policies in favor of transmission development.190 
A shift to socialized cost allocation from beneficiary-pay principles for 
high-voltage interstate transmission facilities does not require changing the 
cost-causation principle.191 Rather, it involves recognizing that for high-
voltage interstate transmission facilities, cost spreading is a more just and rea-
sonable method.192 Socialized cost allocation is simply a fairer representation 
of how consumers benefit from the modern grid.193 
Socialized cost allocation is not a compromise; it is just another form of 
the beneficiary-pay principle.194 Because a transmission facility serves both 
economic and reliability functions, and changes to the grid shift any given fa-
cility’s benefits to different beneficiaries, assigning the cost of a new line to 
specific customers when that facility’s characteristics do not generally fit the 
three basic factors required for accurate economic modeling is problematic.195 
Instead, given that in the modern grid the benefits of specific transmission fa-
cilities routinely shift among users, spreading the cost of new facilities across 
all system users is an acknowledgment that all users in the system benefit from 
the transmission project.196 
Moreover, spreading the costs of these transmission facilities across a grid 
has the potential to further existing state and federal policies.197 Since the 
                                                                                                                           
 190 See id. at 8 (stating that a lack of consensus of how to determine cost allocations has caused 
underinvestment in the grid); infra notes 191–217 and accompanying text (arguing for a consistent 
method of allocating the costs of high voltage interstate transmission facilities). 
191 See PJM, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that socialized cost allocation can be considered 
another form of the beneficiary-pay principle).  
 192 See Maser, supra note 66, at 1832–33 (explaining that FERC already has the recognized pow-
er under the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) of 1978 to socialize the costs of transmission facilities that 
provide a regional economic or reliability benefit); PJM, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that socialized 
cost allocation can already be considered a method of the beneficiary-pay method since it considers all 
users of the grid as beneficiaries). 
 193 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 23–24 (explaining that, given the integrated grid, bene-
fits are now more likely to be spread broadly than narrowly identifiable). 
 194 See PJM, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that socialized cost allocation may be considered anoth-
er form of the beneficiary-pay method because any upgrade to the grid benefits all users, and because 
eventually all users of the grid will be beneficiaries of multiple projects). 
 195 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 14–15 (explaining the dual function of transmission 
facilities as providing economic and reliability benefits); id. at 9 (stating that benefits in the grid shift 
constantly); supra notes 175–187 and accompanying text (noting the difficulty of estimating genera-
tion variability, generation location, and load variability—the three major elements of beneficiary-pay 
modeling). 
 196 See PJM, supra note 15, at 19. Socializing all transmission costs across a Regional Transmis-
sion Operator (“RTO”) or an Independent System Operator (“ISO”) also makes sense from a regulato-
ry perspective, because all capital expenditures for transmission facilities, under the traditional vertical 
monopoly utility model, were socialized among all ratepayers, and RTOs and ISOs are the modern 
equivalent. See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 31–32. 
 197 Klass, supra note 12, at 1119–20 (noting the need for greater investment in transmission if 
state renewable goals are to be met); Moeller, supra note 10, at 78 (describing the importance of 
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1970s, energy policy at the federal has consistently encouraged utilities and 
non-utilities to sell their power at wholesale.198 By allowing generators to ac-
cess the grid and sell electricity on par with incumbent generators, the electric 
market is being pushed towards becoming a competitive marketplace.199 Com-
petitive markets are only possible, however, where there are few physical and 
economic impediments, and limited transmission capacity has increasingly 
become a significant physical impediment to the transmission system. 200 
At the state level, state-mandated renewable energy standards have driven 
demand for high-voltage interstate transmission facilities.201 Large-scale re-
newable energy sources, however, are often located far from urban centers 
where electricity is needed most.202 Thus, there is a need for transmission facil-
ities to span long distances to meet renewable portfolio standards, incentiviz-
ing state public utility commissions (“PUCs”) to allow transmission facilities 
to link to out-of-state generation plants.203 
                                                                                                                           
transmission facilities to the federal policy of creating competitive electricity markets). But see Rossi, 
supra note 29, at 1043 (highlighting well-founded concerns that socialized cost allocation promotes 
increased energy consumption by focusing on increasing capacity, rather than focusing on methods of 
increasing the efficiency of current resources and lowering demand). 
 198 See Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 728 (highlighting the importance of the federal push 
towards competitive electricity markets); Dadok, supra note 56, at 1011 (stating that since the late 
1970s, Congress, the executive branch, and FERC have been pushing the energy market towards 
competitive pricing).  
 199 See Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 728–29 (noting the shift in the electricity market); Bonni-
field & Drewnowski, supra note 7, at 449–50 (summarizing the importance of reduced barriers to the 
markets through the example of the sale of electricity over transmission facilities that occurs between 
wind power from southern California to power heaters in Washington in the winter, and then how in 
the summer Washington sends inexpensive hydroelectric power to southern California to power air 
conditioners). 
 200 Dadok, supra note 56, at 1013. Physical constraints occur where remote generation plants are 
not near consumers, or where transmission facilities are absent. Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 729. 
Economic impediments are caused by inadequate incentives for developing new transmission facili-
ties, where there is congestion in existing transmission lines, or where there are other barriers to entry 
into the market for non-incumbent generators. Id. Currently, the advantage reliability upgrades have in 
cost allocation over economic upgrades has the potential to disincentivize new generation facilities. 
BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 16. FERC outlined the need for new investment in transmission 
facilities in its 2009 to 2014 five year plan. See Moeller, supra note 10, at 77–78. 
 201 See Klass, supra note 12, at 1119 (outlining state incentives for renewable energy growth); 
PJM, supra note 15, at 10 (stating that the North American Energy Reliability Council estimates that 
35% of new transmission facilities above 200 kV in North America are related to accommodating 
renewable resources compared to 7% of the same sized facilities for traditional generation sources); 
supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (summarizing state statutes that incentivize the develop-
ment of renewable energy generation facilities). 
 202 See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 8, at 791 (noting that abundant wind energy is often in 
remote locations far from energy-consuming city centers). 
 203 See Rossi, supra note 29, at 1041 (noting the need for greater high-voltage interstate transmis-
sion investment in order to meet renewable energy goals). Socializing the costs of certain transmission 
facilities may make the more expensive generation facilities that accompany their development more 
feasible or easier to develop. See Maser, supra note 66, at 1854–55. For instance, this could make the 
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Still, state PUCs are often hesitant to impose the cost risks of new trans-
mission facilities on native ratepayers who must then bear the risk of paying 
for the new facility.204 When cost allocation is uncertain, however, disagree-
ments over beneficiaries serve as a straw man for the underlying siting disa-
greement.205 Therefore, minimizing the costs that might be imposed on rate-
payers in a particular state may seek to ease barriers that are artificially im-
posed by state boundaries, not market boundaries.206 
FERC can comply with Order 1000 by only allowing socialized cost allo-
cation because spreading the costs of high-voltage interstate transmission facil-
ities is roughly commensurate with the benefits of these facilities.207 The Order 
requires that the costs of a facility not be thrust upon users that will likely re-
ceive no future benefit from the facility.208 FERC also notes, however, that to 
the extent any model considers benefits and costs, this cost allocation principle 
does not require showing that every transmission facility provide a benefit to 
every consumer being saddled with its cost.209 Rather, aggregate costs must be 
allocated in a manner that is roughly commensurate with aggregate benefits.210 
Therefore, insofar as a transmission facility’s characteristics are such that so-
cialized cost allocation can be considered a variant of the beneficiary-pay prin-
ciple, spreading costs of the transmission facility across a Regional Transmis-
                                                                                                                           
development of remote on-shore wind facilities more feasible and less expensive to develop than more 
contentious but more efficient off-shore wind facilities. Id. 
 204 See Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 725–26 (explaining how PUC and municipality regula-
tors are politically motivated to avoid raising costs on local ratepayers). 
 205 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 2 (calling cost allocation a proxy for siting). The cost of 
each facility is not the issue; rather assigning the costs of who pays is. Id. at 30–31 (noting that rather 
than the actual cost, regulators are concerned about the benefits of the transmission facility to local 
ratepayers). Recall that siting refers to the process of determining the route for a new transmission 
line. See Maser, supra note 66, at 1832; supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 206 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 8 (explaining that the mismatch between jurisdictional 
boundaries and cost allocation determinations is partly to blame for the dearth of transmission invest-
ment); Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 729 (noting that economic barriers must be removed to allow 
proper transmission development). 
 207 See FERC Order 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,932 (stating that cost allocations must roughly equal 
benefits); PJM, supra note 15, at 19 (stating that all users connected to the grid benefit from transmis-
sion projects). 
 208 See FERC Order 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,932 (“A transmission planning region that receives 
no benefit from an interregional transmission facility that is located in that region, either at present or 
in a likely future scenario, must not be involuntarily allocated any of the costs of that facility.”). 
 209 See id. at 49,939 (stating that cost allocation principles do not “require a showing that every 
individual transmission facility in the group of transmission facilities provides benefits to every bene-
ficiary allocated a share of costs of that group of transmission facilities”).  
 210 See id. FERC states that cost allocations need only be “roughly commensurate with estimate 
benefits,” relying on language from the Seventh Circuit which stated that costs need not be calculated 
out to “the last million or ten million or perhaps hundred million dollars.” Illinois I, 576 F.3d at 476–
77. 
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sion Operator (“RTO”) or an Independent System Operator (“ISO”) is con-
sistent with FERC’s principles for cost allocation.211 
Consequently, courts should accept a FERC determination that high-
voltage interstate transmission facilities will only be approved for socialized 
cost allocation.212 For cost allocation determinations, courts should continue to 
require that FERC assess costs and benefits of new high-voltage transmission 
facilities.213 Socialized cost allocation does not allow FERC to duck these re-
quirements.214 Rather, because high-voltage interstate transmission facilities do 
not comfortably lend themselves to beneficiary-pay principles, socializing 
costs is the more well-reasoned option.215 Deciding to socialize the cost alloca-
tion for high-voltage interstate transmission facilities is supported by substan-
tial evidence that beneficiary-pay models have too much error to properly as-
cribe costs to customers on an individualized basis.216 Therefore, the best way 
to ensure the reliability and economic efficiency of the grid into the future is to 
socialize the cost of high-voltage interstate transmission facilities.217 
CONCLUSION 
Cost allocation is a highly contentious topic because states do not want 
their citizens to pay for projects largely benefitting out-of-state consumers. 
This narrow view ignores significant changes over the past few decades to the 
electrical grid making most states reliant on their neighbors. Unfortunately, the 
prevailing views regarding which cost allocation methodologies are just and 
                                                                                                                           
 211 See PJM, supra note 15, at 18–19. The D.C. Circuit accepts the rationale that reducing barriers 
to entry in the wholesale power market is in the public interest, and is therefore a benefit. Entergy 
Servs., Inc. v. FERC, 319 F.3d 536, 543–44 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 212 See W. Mass. Elec. Co. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 922, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that it is just 
and reasonable to consistently socialize the costs of transmission investments across an entire grid). 
 213 See Illinois I, 576 F.3d at 477; Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wis. v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1058, 1061–62 
(D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 214 See Entergy, 319 F.3d at 543–44 (siding with FERC on the notion that a less cabined defini-
tion of benefit comports with the public interest); PJM, supra note 15, at 18 (noting that socialization 
is a form of the beneficiary-pay model). 
 215 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 31–32 (noting the logic of extending cost allocations 
across an entire RTO); Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 763 (explaining that, in order to incentivize 
transmission development, cost allocation decisions must be made beyond state regulators); Rossi, 
supra note 29, at 1029 (explaining that high-voltage interstate transmission facilities are required to 
encourage the development of renewable energy sources). 
 216 See Illinois I, 576 F.3d at 477 (conceding that there are benefits to all consumers when any 
transmission project is built on a network to which the consumer is connected); Town of Norwood v. 
FERC, 962 F.2d 20, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (giving great deference to decisions made by FERC); 
BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 23–24 (explaining that the integrated nature of the grid is such that 
the allocation of costs should be moved more towards socialization). 
217 See BALDICK ET AL., supra note 7, at 26 (noting that spurring transmission development 
can spur economic development in new generation facilities); Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 
755 (noting that beneficiary-pay methods of cost allocation are barriers to development of an 
efficient and reliable grid). 
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reasonable have not yet caught up with the reality of the modern electric grid. 
The currently accepted beneficiary-pay model, although effective for determin-
ing cost allocation in certain situations, has become increasingly flawed when 
assigning the costs of high-voltage interstate transmission facilities in large 
interconnected grids. Instead, socialized cost allocation is the best method of 
allocating the costs of these facilities because it most closely matches how 
consumers on an interconnected grid use and benefit from grid improvements 
over time. Therefore, FERC should use, and the courts should allow, socialized 
cost allocation to satisfy the cost-causation principle for these transmission 
facilities. Only through socialized cost allocation can the United States reap 
the full benefits of a capitalistic energy market. 
JORDAN A. SMITH 
